Monday, August 14, 2006

Villanova Symposium on Daubert

Via TortsProfBlog:
VILLANOVA LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON
EXPERTISE IN THE COURTROOM

Saturday, Oct. 21, 2006, 9 am-3 pm
Villanova University School of Law

The 2006 Norman J. Shachoy Annual Symposium, sponsored by the Villanova Law Review, will be held at Villanova University School of Law on Saturday, October 21, 2006, from 9 am-3 pm. The theme for this year's conference will be EXPERTISE IN THE COURTROOM: SCIENTISTS AND WIZARDS. Speakers include Professors Susan Haack (Miami), Michael Risinger (Seton Hall), Jennifer Mnookin (UCLA), Simon Cole (Univ. Calif.-Irvine), Gary Edmond (Univ. New South Wales), L.H. LaRue (Washington and Lee University), Robert Mosteller (Duke), Micheal Lynch (Cornell), and David Caudill (Villanova).

THEME:

Controversies persist in the regulation of expertise in the courtroom, even after the Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Trilogy, and even in Frye jurisdictions (like Pennsylvania). Judicial images of science and scientists -- of their capabilities and their limitations -- continue to affect judicial evaluation of expertise. Indeed, as Professors Caudill and LaRue argue in their forthcoming NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), trial judges who defer too easily to science, or who expect too much of science, end up (respectively) admitting questionable evidence or rejecting some of the best science.

Please join us for an exploration of the latest developments in the dynamic field of courtroom expertise and admissibility issues.

REGISTRATION/FURTHER INFORMATION:

For further information or for registration materials, please contact:

CONTACT: Professor Caudill
Email: caudill [at] law [dot] villanova [dot] edu

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Fed. R. Evid. 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.