Sunday, April 04, 2004

Daubert and Merger Analysis

A draft paper by Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb, and David T. Scheffman, entitled A Daubert Discipline for Merger Simulation, is posted at the FTC website. From the abstract:

For more than a decade, structural game-theory models have been used to predict the price effects of mergers, using what is termed “merger simulation.” We propose a discipline for merger simulation based on the Daubert reliability screen applied to all expert testimony. Specifically, we propose that every modeling choice in a merger simulation apt to matter significantly be accompanied either by some sort of justification or by a sensitivity analysis indicating its impact.
Worth a look.
Fed. R. Evid. 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.